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Carbuccia: Fifth Amendment

NEW YORK’S GRANT OF GREATER FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS TO SEXUAL PREDATORS IN SOMTA
PROCEEDINGS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
New York v. Suggs1
(decided April 18, 2011)
John Suggs was a repeat sexual offender who objected to being called as a witness in an Article 10 proceeding.2 Suggs argued
that being called to testify against his will violated his privilege
against self-incrimination made available to him by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,3 as well as article I,
section 6 of the New York Constitution.4 The State sought to call
Suggs as a witness in order to prove that Suggs suffered from a Mental Abnormality under Article 10 of New York State‟s Mental Hygiene Law, titled the Sexual Management and Treatment Act [hereinafter “SOMTA”];5 SOMTA provides for the “indefinite confinement
or indefinite strict and intensive supervision and treatment” of persons found to suffer from a mental abnormality.6 Despite the fact that

1

920 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
Id. at 645.
3
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part: “No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
4
Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution reads, in pertinent part: “No person
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself . . . .”
N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6.
5
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
6
See MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i) (2011) (defining a “Mental abnormality” as: “[A] congenital or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct
constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct”).
2

857
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neither the federal nor state‟s constitutions invoke the right against
self-incrimination in SOMTA proceedings, the court concluded that
“the language of Article 10 itself, . . . indicates that the Legislature
did not intend to allow the State to call SOMTA respondents as witnesses for the state over a respondent‟s objection.”7 Thus, the court
denied the motion to compel Suggs to testify absent his consent.8
On January 28, 2009, the State filed a petition against Respondent Suggs for sex offender civil management under Article 10 of
the Mental Hygiene Law, resulting from Suggs‟ extensive history of
sexually committed crimes.9 Dating back to the age of seventeen,
Suggs, who was fifty-nine years of age at the time of the proceeding,
had committed six forcible rapes and two attempted rapes. 10 A
SOMTA jury trial subsequently commenced to have Suggs indefinitely confined as prescribed by the statute.11 During the SOMTA
proceeding, the State produced testimony from two psychologists,
Dr. Stuart Kirschner and Dr. Tricia Peterson.12 Both psychologists
were of the opinion that Suggs suffered from a Mental Abnormality
under the act.13 A third psychologist, Dr. Joseph Plaud, presented by
Suggs, testified that Suggs “did not suffer from such a Mental Ab-

7

Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
Id. at 654.
9
Id. at 645.
10
New York v. Suggs, No. 30051-09, 2011 WL 2586413, at *5, *21 (N.Y. June 30,
2011). In 1968, Suggs pled guilty to Rape in the First Degree for attacks allegedly committed against several women in the surrounding area of City College, located in Manhattan.
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645. Suggs was sentenced to a term of five to fifteen years of incarceration as a result of his guilty plea. Id. Ten years later, the federal district court found that
Suggs was not mentally competent enough to enter a guilty plea. Id. This decision was
granted following Suggs‟ petition for a writ of habeas corpus after lengthy state and federal
appeals. Id. The decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit in Suggs v. LaVallee, 570
F.2d 1092 (1978). Id. Suggs was consequently released from prison. Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d
at 645. Shortly thereafter—twenty-eight days later—Suggs was once again charged with
rape. Id. Following his conviction, Suggs was sentenced to seventy-four months to twenty
years incarceration. Id. In 1996, four years after his release, Suggs was convicted of Rape
in the First Degree by forcible compulsion and was sentenced to twelve and one-half years
of incarceration. Id.
11
Id.
12
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
13
Id. Dr. Kirshner summarized his views as follows: “Mr. Suggs is an extremely dangerous man. He is under no uncertain terms a serial rapist. . . . And other than the fact that he‟s
aged . . . there is nothing different about him today than there was 40 years ago.” Suggs,
2011 WL 2586413, at *7.
8
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normality.”14 The State then moved to call Suggs as a witness to
prove that he did in fact satisfy SOMTA‟s definition of such condition.15
Suggs objected to being called as a witness for the State, arguing that the State could not require him to testify against his will in
an Article 10 proceeding.16 Whether the State may compel a respondent to testify against his will during such a proceeding was an issue
of first impression for the New York County Supreme Court. 17 The
New York County Supreme Court denied the State‟s motion to compel the respondent to testify, holding that “absent the consent of a
respondent, a respondent cannot be called as a witness by the State at
an Article 10 trial and be compelled to testify against himself.”18 The
court in Suggs began its determination by acknowledging that there
were five relevant constitutional and statutory provisions linked to
the issue before the court19: (1) the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution,20 (2) article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution,21 (3) Civil Practice Rules and Law section 4512,22 (4) Civil
Practice Rules and Law section 4501,23 and (5) Article 10 of the

14

Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (emphasis added). “The age of Mr. Suggs . . . meant that
he could not opine that Mr. Suggs was likely to re-offend if released, even if released with
no supervision.” Suggs, 2011 WL 2586413, at *10.
15
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645. “The State had earlier alerted the Court and the Respondent that they might be moving to call the Respondent as a witness and the Court had previously heard legal arguments on the issue.” Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 644.
18
Id. at 654.
19
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
20
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
22
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4512, entitled “Competency of interest witness or spouse” states, “Except as otherwise expressly prescribed, a person shall not be excluded or excused from being
a witness, by reason of his interest in the event or because he is a party or the spouse of a
party.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4512 (McKinney 2012).
23
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4501, entitled “Self-incrimination,” states:
A competent witness shall not be excused from answering a relevant
question, on the ground only that the answer may tend to establish that
he owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a civil suit. This section does
not require a witness to give an answer which will tend to accuse himself
of a crime or to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture, nor does it vary
any other rule respecting the examination of a witness.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4501 (McKinney 2012).
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Mental Hygiene Law.24
The court in Suggs started its analysis of the Fifth Amendment by referring to Allen v. Illinois,25 a United States Supreme Court
decision which upheld the constitutionality of civil management and
denied the defendant the right to assert his privilege against selfincrimination.26 In Allen, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
“whether proceedings under the Illinois „Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act‟ [hereinafter “the Act”] were criminal within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment‟s guarantee against compulsory selfincrimination.”27 The petitioner in Allen, Terry B. Allen, was
charged with committing unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault.28 The state subsequently filed a petition to have Allen declared
a sexually dangerous person.29
At trial, the State presented testimony of two psychiatrists despite Allen‟s objections that it violated his privilege against selfincrimination.30 Both psychiatrists testified that the “petitioner was
mentally ill and had criminal propensities to commit sexual assaults.”31 The trial court found the petitioner to be sexually danger24

Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645. See also Mental Hygiene Legal Service v. Spitzer, No. 07
Civ. 2935(GEL), 2007 WL 4115936, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating the history behind
SOMTA).
On March 14, 2007, Governor Spitzer signed the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act, which became effective on April 13, 2007,
in part as Article 10 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”),
creating a new legal regime for “Sex Offenders Requiring Civil Commitment or Supervision.” As part of the Act, the New York Legislature
found that “recidivistic sex offenders pose a danger to society that
should be addressed through comprehensive programs of treatment and
management,” . . . and that some “sex offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them to engage in repeated sex offenses” . . . . The
Legislature concluded that such offenders „should receive . . . treatment
while they are incarcerated as a result of the criminal process, and should
continue to receive treatment when that incarceration comes to an end.
In extreme cases, confinement of the most dangerous offenders will need
to be extended by civil process in order to provide them such treatment
and to protect the public from their recidivist conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
25
478 U.S. 364 (1986).
26
Id. at 375.
27
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
28
Allen, 478 U.S. at 365.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 366.
31
Id.
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ous under the Act.32 The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed, and
held that “the trial court had improperly relied upon testimony obtained in violation of petitioner‟s privilege against selfincrimination.”33 The Supreme Court of Illinois reinstated the trial
court‟s decision and found the petitioner to be a sexually dangerous
person under the Act.34 The court held that “the privilege against
self-incrimination was not available in sexually-dangerous-person
proceedings because they are „essentially civil in nature,‟ the aim of
the statute being to provide „treatment, not punishment.‟ ”35 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari,36 and in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Rehnquist, the Court concluded that “the
Illinois proceedings . . . were not „criminal‟ within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that due
process does not independently require application of the privilege
[against self-incrimination].”37 In making its determination, the Supreme Court looked to the language of the Illinois statute.38 The
Court found that a civil label is not always held to be dispositive.39
The Court stated that “[w]here a defendant has provided „the clearest
proof‟ that „the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate [the State‟s] intention‟ that the proceeding be civil,
it must be considered criminal and the privilege against selfincrimination must be applied.”40 The Court ultimately concluded
that the statutory scheme was civil in nature, not criminal, because it
did not have such a punitive effect.41
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, dissented, stating that a procedure must be labeled a
“criminal case” under the Fifth Amendment in situations where the
“criminal law casts so long a shadow on a putatively civil proceed-

32

Id.
Allen, 478 U.S at 367 (citation omitted).
34
Id.
35
Id. (citation omitted).
36
Id. at 368.
37
Id. at 375.
38
See Allen, 478 U.S at 368 (noting that the question of “whether a particular proceeding
is criminal for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is first of all a question of statutory construction” (citations omitted)).
39
Id. at 369.
40
Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
41
Id. at 375.
33
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ing.”42 Justice Stevens reasoned that:
The impact of an adverse judgment against an individual deemed to be a “sexually dangerous person” is at
least as serious as a guilty verdict in a typical criminal
trial . . . . [T]he sexually-dangerous-person proceeding
authorizes far longer imprisonment than a mere finding of guilt on an analogous criminal charge.43
The dissent disagreed with the majority‟s justification that
persons found to be sexually dangerous are a threat to society.44 The
dissent argued that this finding does not suffice as a justification for
denying an individual the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, for the right would be unavailable to anyone who is
accused of committing a violent crime.45 Moreover, the dissent also
noted that even though the State may undergo greater difficulty in
finding evidence that will lead to imprisonment—absent a defendant‟s testimony—this difficulty also does not justify the denial of
one‟s privilege against self-incrimination.46 Otherwise, the right
against self-incrimination “would never be justified, for it could always be said to have that effect.”47 Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with the majority, as well as with the Supreme Court of Illinois; he consequently would have affirmed the decision of the
Appellate Court of Illinois, which held that Allen‟s privilege against
self-incrimination was, in fact, violated.48
Although the majority in Allen consisted of only five justic49
es, it has since been the leading authority for the United States Supreme Court.50 Clear support does not exist for the proposition that a
respondent can refuse to answer questions in an Article 10 proceeding under the Fifth Amendment‟s privilege against self42

Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Allen, 478 U.S at 377. See also United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d
931 (7th Cir. 1975) (recognizing that a proceeding under the Sexually Dangerous Person‟s
Act can lead to far longer imprisonment, an indeterminate commitment, than a guilty charge
in a criminal trial).
44
Allen, 478 U.S. at 382 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
People v. Allen, 463 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), rev’d, Allen, 478 U.S. 364.
49
Allen, 478 U.S. at 365.
50
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48.
43
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incrimination.51 For instance, in Kansas v. Hendricks,52 the United
States Supreme Court held that persons found to have a “Mental Abnormality” are to be committed under civil management and are not
entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment.53 In Hendricks,
Kansas enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act which set-forth
procedures for the civil commitment of all individuals who were
found to have a “mental abnormality” or a personality disorder, and
who were considered “likely to engage in „predatory acts of sexual
violence.‟ ”54 The defendant in this case, Leroy Hendricks, was an
inmate with a long history of sexually molesting children.55 Hendricks admitted that he abused children whenever he was not imprisoned.56 He further stated that the only way to be sure that he would
not sexually abuse another child was if he were to die.57 Hendricks
was subsequently found to be a sexually violent predator under the
statute.58 Hendricks appealed this finding, arguing that the Sexually
Violent Predator Act established a criminal proceeding, and he was
therefore entitled to his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.59
In upholding civil management in Hendricks, the Supreme
Court underwent the same analysis as it did in Allen, and similarly
found:
[C]ommitment under the Act does not implicate either
51

Id. at 648.
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
53
Id. at 369.
54
Id. at 350 (citation omitted).
55
Id. Hendricks‟ sexually violent history consisted of the following: In 1955, Hendricks
exposed his genitals to two young girls and pleaded guilty to indecent exposure. Id. at 354.
In 1957, he was convicted of lewdness involving a young girl and received a brief jail sentence. Hendricks, 521 U.S at 354. In 1960, he molested two young boys while he worked
for a carnival and served two years in prison. Id. On parole, he molested a 7 year-old girl
and was rearrested. Id. In 1965, he was released from a state psychiatric hospital where attempts had been made to treat his sexual deviance. Id. In 1967, Hendricks assaulted another
young boy and girl. Id. He performed oral sex on the 8-year old girl and fondled the 11
year-old boy. Hendricks, 521 U.S at 354. He refused to participate in a sex offender treatment program, and therefore remained incarcerated until his parole in 1972. Id. “In 1984,
Hendricks was convicted of taking „indecent liberties‟ with two 13-year-old boys.” Id. at
353.
56
Id. at 355.
57
Id.
58
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.
59
Id. at 361.
52
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of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment:
retribution or deterrence. The Act‟s purpose is not retributive because it does not affix culpability for prior
criminal conduct. Instead, such conduct is used solely
for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate that a
„mental abnormality‟ exists or to support a finding of
future dangerousness.60
The Court did not find commitment under Kansas‟ Sexually
Violent Predator Act to be of a punitive nature.61 On the contrary,
the Court found that it was far from punitive, and that the confinement‟s duration was directly linked to the need to protect society.62
Thus, a person‟s confinement would continue until the individual‟s
“mental abnormality” is no longer considered to be a threat to the
community.63 The Supreme Court ultimately held that involuntary
confinement under the Sexually Violent Predator Act did not establish a criminal proceeding.64
Adhering to federal precedent, New York courts have relied
on Allen and its progeny in cases presenting similar issues. For example, in State v. Nelson,65 the New York County Supreme Court
“analyzed the question of whether the retroactive designation of certain non-sex crimes as „sexually-motivated‟ felonies eligible for coverage under SOMTA violated the ex post facto clause of the United
States Constitution.”66 The respondent, Nelson, was convicted for
kidnapping, promoting prostitution, and bail jumping.67 A sex offender civil management petition was filed against Nelson.68 Nelson
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it violated the United
States and New York State Constitutions.69 In accordance with the
reasoning of the majority opinion in Allen, the New York County Supreme Court held that “SOMTA‟s retroactive designation of certain

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 (citation omitted).
Id. at 369.
No. 20459, 2010 WL 4628018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 2010).
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
Nelson, 2010 WL 4628018, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *1.
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prior criminal convictions as sexually motivated was a civil procedure.”70
Many other New York courts have also relied on Allen, and
have held that statutes similar to SOMTA fall under civil proceedings, and therefore the privilege against self-incrimination is inapplicable.71 In State v. C.B.,72 the Bronx County Supreme Court dealt
with the same issue as the court in Suggs, and held that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply in proceedings pursuant to Article 10.73 In C.B., respondent C.B. made a
videotaped confession.74 On the tape, C.B. described eleven separate
events in which he masturbated on sleeping females while unlawfully
entering private residences, and further admitted to being an exhibitionist.75 C.B. also stated that he needed help to deal with an alleged
disease that was to blame for his repeatedly committing such
crimes.76
C.B. challenged the admission of these tapes, arguing that it
would violate his “constitutional right to challenge the voluntariness
of the confession, since none of the procedural avenues to challenge
that admission of the videotape which are available in a criminal proceeding apply under Article 10.”77 The court decided that the videotaped statements made by C.B. were relevant and necessary for the
jury to make a determination as to C.B.‟s present mental condition.78

70

Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
Id. at 647. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (noting that the legislature found it necessary to establish a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of the
sexually violent predator); Nelson, 2010 WL 4628018, at *9 (finding that retroactive sexually motivated felonies were not punitive. Id. “[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.”) (citations omitted); In re Michael WW., 798 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2005)
(finding that whether or not respondent voluntarily waived his Miranda rights was “irrelevant to a Family Court Article 10 proceeding because they are grounded in the rights to remain silent and to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which only apply in the
context of criminal proceedings”); and Ughetto v. Acrish, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (App. Div.
2d Dep‟t 1981) (adopting the reasoning in Allen and finding that “involuntary commitment
proceedings under the Mental Hygiene Law are civil and not criminal in nature”).
72
No. 51010(U), 2009 WL 1460779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 2009).
73
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647 (quoting C.B., 2009 WL 1460779, at *3).
74
C.B., 2009 WL 1460779, at *1.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at *3.
71
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The court conclusively held that “[n]o Fifth Amendment right applies
in this civil, sex offender commitment proceeding.”79
While courts have consistently held that the constitutional
right against self-incrimination does not apply in civil management
cases, the court in Suggs acknowledged that New York has afforded
greater rights under the New York Constitution than those of the
United States Constitution.80 The New York Court of Appeals has
provided greater protection despite the fact that article I, section 6 of
the New York State Constitution contains the same substantive language as that of the Fifth Amendment.81 In determining “whether the
state constitution provides broader protections than a federal constitutional provision with identical language . . . New York courts engage
in an analysis known as „noninterpretive review.‟ ”82 Such an analysis can be seen in the case In re Nassau County Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated June 24, 2003 [hereinafter Duces Tecum],83
where the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with the issue
of “whether the New York privilege against compelled selfincrimination . . . afford[s] greater protection regarding fundamental
rights than the Federal Constitution and the United States Supreme
Court.”84
The court in Duces Tecum established a “two-pronged „interpretive‟ and „nointerpretive‟ analysis of various factors to determine
if a provision of [a] State Constitution should be construed more
broadly than its federal analog.”85 This analysis consists of “first review[ing] the text of the state and federal constitutional provisions[,]
„[i]f the language of the State Constitution differs from that of its
Federal counterpart, then the court may conclude that there is a basis
for a different interpretation of it.‟ ”86 When there is not a “material

79

C.B., 2009 WL 1460779, at *3 (citations omitted).
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 648 (citations omitted).
81
Id. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that
New York‟s right to counsel “extends well beyond the right to counsel afforded by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and other State Constitutions”); see also
People v. Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937, 938 (N.Y. 1986) (reading a constitutional rule practicable
even if it were if it were deemed inconsistent with federal constitutional rule).
82
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
83
830 N.E.2d 1118 (N.Y. 2005).
84
Id. at 1123.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citation omitted).
80
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textual difference between the relevant constitutional provisions,” the
court must only “conduct a „noninterpretive‟ review of the constitutional provisions.”87 The court noted that a noninterpretive review
seeks to discover:
[A]ny preexisting State statutory or common law defining the scope of the individual right in question; the
history and traditions of the State in its protection of
that individual right; any identification of the right in
the State Constitution as being one of peculiar State or
local concern; and any distinctive attitudes of the State
citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of
the individual right.88
Such a finding leads to the conclusion that a broader reading of the
state constitutional provision is applicable.89 However, after conducting this noninterpretive analysis, the New York Court of Appeals in
Duces Tecum concluded that “none of the factors that would suggest
a broader reading of article I, section 6 were present.”90
A noninterpretive review analysis may help support a broad
reading of Suggs‟ SOMTA. However, there is yet to be a case
“where such an analysis has been conducted with respect to whether
respondents in proceedings which bear some resemblance to Article
10 have a right against self-incrimination which is broader than that
provided by the federal constitution.”91 Thus, no support exists for a
broader reading of the New York Constitution.92
The court in Suggs did not have clear support for the proposition that a respondent in an Article 10 trial may refuse to answer
questions by asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.93 The United States Supreme Court has consistently
followed the reasoning found in the seminal case Allen and its progeny, concluding that Article 10 proceedings are civil in nature. Similarly, there is also a lack of support for the proposition that article I,
section 6 of the New York State Constitution provides a more expan87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
Duces Tecum, 830 N.E.2d at 1123-24 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1124.
Id.
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
Id.
Id.
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sive right than the Fifth Amendment, for the New York courts have
yet to undergo a noninterpretive review analysis which would support
a broader interpretation of the statute found in Suggs.94 The New
York County Supreme Court then questioned whether either New
York‟s Civil Practice Rules and Law section 4501 entitled, “Self Incrimination,” or section 4512, entitled, “Competency of Witness or
Spouse,” was applicable to Article 10.95
The court in Suggs again was unable to find clear authority
for a respondent‟s right to refuse to answer questions in an Article 10
proceeding under Civil Practice Rules and Law section 4501.96 Civil
Practice Rules and Law section 4501 provides that an individual is
not to be excused from answering relevant questions in civil cases, or
in cases which tend to prove that the individual owes a debt.97 However, it goes on to state that one would not be required “to give an answer which will tend to accuse himself of a crime or to expose him to
a penalty or forfeiture . . . .”98 The court noted that “[t]he scope of
this protection is unclear, . . .” for caselaw provides little guidance.99
While New York courts have provided this privilege to respondents
in Article 81 guardianship proceedings, the Fourth Department “recently held that the Fifth Amendment‟s right against compulsory selfincrimination did not apply to Article 81 guardianship proceedings
and that a respondent subject to an Article 81 petition can be compelled to testify at a hearing against his will.”100 The disparity between federal precedent and state caselaw does not provide support
for allowing a respondent‟s refusal to answer questions under Civil
Practice Rules and Law section 4501.101 Additionally, the court
found that Article 10 explicitly includes Civil Practice Rules and Law
section 4512, which “supports the notion that respondents may be
called as witnesses by the State at a SOMTA trial.”102 Instead the
court found that section 10.07(c) of New York‟s Mental Hygiene
Law “explicitly provides that the statute shall be governed by the
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
Id. at 648-50.
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4501 (McKinney 2012).
Id.
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
Id. at 649-50 (citation omitted).
Id. at 650.
Id. (emphasis added).
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provisions of Article 45 of the CPLR.”103 Thus, Article 10 specifically includes the CPLR provision, which “allows one party to call an
opposing party as a witness,” which helps support the proposition
that the State is allowed to call respondents to testify in SOMTA proceedings.104
The New York County Supreme Court then underwent an
analysis of whether the language of Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene
Law itself allowed the State to call a respondent as a witness over the
respondent‟s objection.105 The court noted that this issue was complex.106 The court stated that “the treatment of the issue in contexts
analogous to SOMTA has been a close question.”107 The court found
that numerous provisions of Article 10 indicate that the Legislature
did not intend to allow for the State to call a respondent as a witness
over the respondent‟s objection.108 The court noted that, “[f]irst, Article 10 directly addresses the question of who may call the respondent as a witness at an Article 10 trial.”109 However, “[t]he statute
does not contain any provision . . . which authorizes the State to call a
respondent as a witness at his own trial [which] . . . creates a strong
inference that the Legislature did not intend the State to have that
right.”110
Second, the court interpreted section 10.06(d) of the Mental
Hygiene Law to be a strong inference of the fact that the “Legislature
intended the decision on whether to testify at an Article 10 trial to
rest with respondents alone.”111 This section provides the Attorney
General with the power to “request that a respondent be subject to a
psychiatric examination . . . upon such a request the Court must order
such an examination.”112 However, the statute does not provide any
sanction or punishment for a respondent who “refuses to submit to

103

Id.
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 650 (emphasis added).
105
Id. at 651-52.
106
Id. at 651.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 651. The statute provides, “The respondent may, as a matter of
right, testify in his or her own behalf, call and examine other witnesses, and produce other
evidence in his or her behalf.” Id. (citation omitted).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. (citation omitted).
104
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such an examination.”113 The statute‟s only remedy available against
a respondent who refuses examination is that the State is entitled to
an instruction to the jury that such respondent refused examination.114
The court in Suggs ultimately concluded that “the most reasonable inference which can be drawn from the provisions of Article
10 is that the Legislature implicitly assumes that the well-established
right of a criminal defendant to refuse to be called by the prosecution
would apply in Article 10 trials.”115 Thus, a respondent cannot be
compelled to testify against himself.116
Rather than deferring to the discretion of the United States
Supreme Court or New York State decisional law, the court in Suggs
blatantly defies both federal precedent and State law. The court relied on the language of Article 10, and inferred that the Legislature
intended for Article 10 to provide protections not afforded by either
the Federal Constitution, or the New York State Constitution. This
holding is likely to create a significant amount of controversy.
Although Suggs‟ holding at first glance appears to have a
compelling social policy justification—not allowing a respondent to
incriminate him or herself in a case where he or she can be greatly
impacted by an adverse judgment117—this holding will most likely
lead to serious complications. For instance, by allowing individuals
the right to assert their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in cases where the defendant is a repeat offender, the
State may be presented with fact-finding issues. The court will consequently be presented with great difficulty in proving that the respondent in fact suffers from a mental abnormality under SOMTA or
similar statutes. Proponents of the holding may offer the argument
that the jury may still find a respondent to suffer from a mental abnormality, despite the individual not being compelled to testify.118
However, testimony such as that of Respondent Hendricks in Hendricks would be foreclosed from trial, and evidence may be insuffi113

Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
Id. at 651-52.
115
Id. at 653.
116
Id. at 654.
117
See Allen, 478 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the finding of an individual to be a sexually dangerous person “authorizes far longer imprisonment than a mere
finding of guilt on an analogous criminal charge”).
118
See Suggs, No. 30051-09, 2011 WL 2586413, at *25 (finding Respondent Suggs to be
a “Dangerous Sex Offender in Need of Confinement”).
114
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cient to ensure a correct holding.
Furthermore, Suggs holding creates tension with the court‟s
holding in C.B. For instance, if New York courts were to follow the
court‟s decision in Suggs, courts would hold a respondent‟s videotaped confession to be privileged, and would therefore hold it to be
inadmissible evidence to prove the individual suffers from a mental
abnormality. The court‟s decision in Suggs may consequently lead to
the release of potentially dangerous persons into society who will
continue to commit crimes against others.119
Proponents of the Suggs decision may further argue that
Suggs‟ holding provides a safeguard for individuals whose liberty is
threatened by civil management. By refusing to be a witness against
oneself, an individual is protected from the severe results of an adverse judgment. A finding that one suffers from a Mental Abnormality leads to indefinite confinement or long term treatment. However, as the majority in Allen reasoned, civil management
proceedings are designed to provide care and treatment for persons
who are found to pose a threat to the community. These individuals
will be released from such facilities as soon as he or she is no longer
seen to be dangerous to others.120 Statues such as those in Allen or
Suggs, allow for the overall protection of one‟s community. Suggs‟
holding conversely leads to the protection of a person who puts the
lives of the others in direct danger, rather than providing treatment
for such an individual before releasing him or her into society. This
court should defer to the judgment of the Supreme Court, rather than
creating such controversy and potential danger.
Lina R. Carbuccia*

119

See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 353. Respondent Hendricks admitted that he had repeatedly
abused children whenever he was not confined, and also stated that “the only way he could
keep from sexually abusing children in the future was „to die.‟ ” Id. at 355.
120
See Allen, 478 U.S. at 370 (reasoning that the State has an obligation to provide care
and treatment for the recovery of persons found to be sexually dangerous under the statute).
*
Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, May 2013; B.A.
2008, St. Francis College. I would like to thank all the people who have made a difference
in my life, especially, my mother, father, sister, and two brothers. Special thanks to Heather
Anderson for her editing and helpful advice. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor
Seplowitz for her exceptional insight and advice throughout this process.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

15

